Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. ii
restructure its forces to accommodate a new arm. 1 The leadership refused to create more tank battalions or stand down any cavalry regiments. It was institutional constraints, at least in part, that prevented the British Army from acting upon revolutionary changes in the nature of war, which had been manifest since the later phases of the First World War with the appearance of the tank.
The negative example of the American Marine Corps is also instructive. In the late from the Sea concept. Its centerpiece was the Projection Prepositioning Force Squadrons with their ultrafast intratheater transport ships (UFITS). In the CINCs' minds the maritime prepositioning force was relegated to an "also ran" status as a strategic deployment option.
As a result, the Marine Corps was never fully funded for a follow-on concept for its maritime prepositioning force and was unable to sufficiently recapitalize the aging ships and equipment. The Army was left as the sole deployer of large-scale sustainable expeditionary forces. The Marine Corps had only the smaller-scale forcible entry and crisis response functions."
The speaker paused for effect and concluded, "The Marine Corps' operational effectiveness in the interwar period was hampered, like the British, by attachments to the tried and true doctrine and force structure of the past." The Marine Expeditionary Unit is a task organization that is normally built around a battalion landing team, composite helicopter squadron, and logistics support unit. It fulfills routine forward afloat deployment requirements, and is capable of relatively limited combat operations.
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The Marine Expeditionary Force is normally built around a division-wing team, but can can include more than one division or aircraft wing, together with an appropriate combat service support organization. The MEF is capable of conducting a wide range of amphibious assault operations and sustained operations ashore.
5
A maritime prepositioning force is a task organization of units under one commander formed for the purpose of introducing a MAGTF and its associated equipment and supplies into a secure area.
The Problem
The smoke from the collapse of the iron curtain has not completely cleared yet. The shapes of future threats are starting to come into focus but are barely discernible. Ashore, 1997. 7 Ibid.
controversial Atlantic Monthly article and subsequent book. 8 His disturbing account predicted the spread of tribal violence, forced ethnic migrations, and failed states in the developing world. It is into this world where life on the littorals is "nasty, brutish, and short" that the capability to project naval power ashore will ostensibly be not only relevant but central.
Operational Maneuver From the Sea, hereafter referred to as OMFTS, prudently warns that "it is imperative that the Marine Corps resist the temptation to prepare only for one conflict." 9 Given that the course, or at least the cardinal direction, to the future has been set with OMFTS, it is somewhat disingenuous then to caution against focusing on the threat it identifies.
The requirements to conduct OMFTS are well under construction in a number of projects being conducted under the rubric of Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010. Preliminary assessments from these projects are already driving weapons acquisition and doctrine development. While the Marine Corps is not exactly preparing for only one conflict, it is beginning to organize, train, and equip itself for a defined arena in a manner which may limit its options in the future. The maritime prepositioning force came into its present configuration well before the advent of Operational Maneuver from the Sea. Even with the extensive enhancements planned in the interim, it will not be capable of the operations envisioned in the new concept. "A cursory application of OMFTS principles," in the view of a recent assessment "indicates that the current MPSs (maritime prepositioning squadrons) are ill equipped to handle the expected demands." 
CHAPTER THREE MPF ORIGINS AND CASE STUDIES

Creation of the Maritime P repositioning Force
The maritime prepositioning force is a carryover from the Cold War which was subsequently adapted for the dual major regional conflict national security strategy under review. 
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A Marine Expeditionary Brigade was a task organization that was normally built around a regimental landing team, provisional Marine aircraft group, and a logistics support group. A task force this size is capable of conducting of conducting amphibious assault operations of limited scope.
Prior to the Gulf War the equipment and supplies aboard the ships were uniformly loaded with each ship having approximately the same "manifest." This was done to minimize the effect that the loss of one ship might have if the majority of one item of equipment, for example the previously mentioned rough terrain container handlers, had all been aboard that vessel. For a full squadron offload in a major regional conflict, this was the overriding consideration.
After the war the squadrons were reloaded in configurations better designed for lesser contingencies. There are two and three ship "modules" for smaller task forces. It is also possible to selectively offload equipment and supplies for a smaller, Marine Expeditionary Unit sized MAGTF.
The Marine Corps has plans underway to expand the current Maritime Prepositioning
Force by three ships, one to each squadron. These new ships will carry equipment to build an expeditionary airfield, a command and control suite to support joint task force operations, a fleet hospital, as well as equipment required to support a naval construction battalion and perform repairs on armored vehicles.
13 These plans will be discussed in more detail later under the Enhanced Maritime Prepositioning Force.
Prepositioned Forces and Crisis Response: Case Studies
The employment of the maritime prepositioning force during Desert Shield was generally viewed as a bright spot in the performance of the Military Sealift Command. Two of the MPSRONs were offloaded in August following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and the third was ordered to the theater in November. The tanks off of the first two squadrons of Marines taking part in the operation.
The ships provided 1,575,000 gallons of potable water while at anchor off the Somali coast until other water production means were established and wells were dug. 14 After their cargo was offloaded in Somalia, the ships served as freighters, making shuttle runs between Mombasa and Mogadishu. The command and control equipment aboard the vessels even allowed them to be used to serve as port control, coordinating ship movements in and out of Mogadishu. MPSRON-2 sailed to ports in Saudi Arabia during the crisis. Concurrently, the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) units designated for MPSRON-2 were placed on alert. By the time the ships were arriving in force from 17 to 19 November, the Iraqi armor units had pulled back and the crisis was winding down. The Iraqi withdrawal obviated the need to actually deploy the I MEF units, but the potential to do so provided the combatant CTNC with the capability to respond with a credible force.
Maritime prepositioning ships have also been used in domestic disaster relief operations.
The water production systems aboard the ships that were workhorses during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia were just as valuable after hurricanes in the Pacific. Each vessel can store over 85,000 gallons of water and can produce more potable water using reverse osmosis equipment.
CHAPTER FOUR THE FUTURE OF MARITIME PREPOSITIONING
The Gulf War revealed some shortcomings of the maritime prepositioning force. A congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) analyzed these deficiencies after the war and noted the glaring inadequacy in armored forces for scenarios such as that in Southwest Asia. At the start of the war, there were only ninety tanks prepositioned, thirty in each squadron. The MRS recommended increasing the total to 120.
The deployment of maritime prepositioning ships to Somalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE revealed additional deficiencies, especially in the area of heavy engineer support required for operation areas with poor infrastructure and sparse facilities. The need for prepositioned equipment for the naval construction force (NCF) of the MAGTF was identified.
As discussed previously, the Marine Corps is adding three ships, one to each squadron to forward deploy the important capabilities of constructing an expeditionary airfield, a fleet hospital, the command and control suite for a joint task force headquarters, naval construction battalion equipment, and repair of armored forces.
A Muscular MPF 2010: "Kicking the door in a little bit"
Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010 is difficult to conceptualize in concrete terms. Thus far it is more a set of requirements than even a hypothetical squadron of ships. Even what does exist in desired capabilities is dynamic and hard to pin down.
Lieutenant General James L. Jones, the former Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy, and Operations articulated the general nature of these capabilities in an interview with Navy Times last fall. In making his case to regional CINCs he championed the maritime prepositioning force as a crisis response option rather than just a logistics asset. Stating that "maritime prepositioning isn't just bringing ships stocked with war gear closer to the foxhole," he maintained that it should be thought of as "ARGs (amphibious ready groups) without the sailors or the Marines." 17 In comparing it to an amphibious ready group he hinted at the two new roles he envisioned, first "prepositioning ships will virtually shadow amphibious ready groups deploying with Marine expeditionary units," and second, its future employment "in those instances where maybe you have to kick the door in a little bit." 
Overcoming Limitations
The Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF), MPF's predecessor, had three requirements which limited its employment: a port facility with berthing spaces for pierside offload, an airfield for both strategic airlift and the fly-in echelon, and a large tactical assembly area ashore where the ground combat element and combat service support element could marry up with their equipment.
The embarkation of lighters on the maritime prepositioning ships, which permitted in-stream offload, eliminated the requirement for a port facility. The current addition of an expeditionary airfield (EM) set for the enhanced maritime prepositioning force will give the _____________________________________________________________________________
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Interview by Gidget Fuentes, "A Floating Dump? Think Again, " Navy Times, November 4,1997, p.25. 18 Ibid. As attractive as acquiring this capability might be for the Marine Corps, it must be recognized that it may come at a price. There is a strong distaste in Congress today for expensive "platforms." There is always the possibility, if not the near certainty, that if the Marine Corps decides to "trade up" to MPF 2010, they will get fewer ships or squadrons, or both.
CHAPTER FIVE ALTERNATE FUTURES
Four widely held alternative futures, to include the Marine Corps' "chaos in the littorals" will be examined. After a brief discussion of each scenario, the three options discussed previously will be weighed. Briefly, these are: renew the leases on the maritime prepositioning ships in the current force, replace the force with new ships capable of assembly at sea and tactical offload in a non-benign environment or develop a new concept for Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010. The capabilities inherent in Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010 will be analyzed in this context to ascertain its utility, deficiencies, and excess capability. What a new concept might look like will also be discussed in each case.
Noncombat Functions
For the sake of intellectual rigor it is necessary to at least consider the remote likelihood In the "MEU Slice," all equipment comes from one MPS ship, capable of providing 2,700 Marines with fifteen days sustainment. located near the continental United States would be more useful than the current deployment. A case could be made for a squadron on the Gulf, East, and West Coasts. Two more, possibly in Hawaii and the Azores, would round out this force.
Chaos in the Littorals
Since this scenario has already been discussed at length, there is no need to develop it farther. The slogan of those who hold to this vision might be, "The future looks more like the OMFTS predicts a low-intensity conflict world. The Marine Corps wants to take a force designed initially to deter Soviet aggression on the flanks of Eurasia, subsequently improved to respond better to major regional conflicts, then enhanced further with more ships, and finally replace it with a MEB sized quasi-amphibious assault force, but would justify it at least in part on the basis of "speeding relief to those in need."
Focusing on getting the force inland more efficiently and obviating the need to build up logistics ashore misses the essential character of 'operations other than war.' The core of the mission in Somalia was to "establish a secure environment" for facilitating humanitarian relief.
The Marines can occupy objectives with the ruthless efficiency of a German blitzkrieg, but unless the hodge podge of non-governmental organizations that do the food distribution are ready to adopt OMFTS, then a logistics infrastructure ashore is still required.
This argument does not discount the vulnerability of stockpiles ashore to attack. A maritime prepositioning force designed around "chaos in the littorals" and hedging its bets on major regional conflict and a distant superpower, looks far different from one designed with the high end threats in mind while hedging its bets on "chaos." Maritime Prepositioning
Force 2010 looks more like the former than the latter with its "tailored loads" as an afterthought.
If the "worldwide breakdown of order" looks anything like Somalia, then the current level of capability looks adequate. The enhanced maritime prepositioning force falls into the "nice to have" category. The field hospital, joint task force headquarters command and control suite, and naval construction battalion equipment look like especially welcome additions. The remaining extra capabilities are luxuries.
Taking into account the increasing frequency of non-combatant evacuations, one improvement could be made. Those operations in benign environments, which do not require forcible entry by MEUs or special forces, could conceivably be handled by the air contingency MAGTFs. These forces on standby for crisis response could link up with a "MEU slice" maritime prepositioning ship. This would require the Marine Corps practicing and demonstrating to theater CINCs that this is a credible option. Non-combatant evacuations in hostile environments would continue to require MEUs or Army special forces.
Major Regional Contingencies
Although many in Congress no longer view fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts a realistic threat scenario, there are still those who do. In fact a former , 1996) and into the next. He looks at the possibility of a North Korean attack on the South, a nuclear armed Iran launching an Islamic jihad, a multi-division U.S. intervention in Mexico to stem a mass migration, Russia rising out of the ashes and invading western Europe, and a Japan forced down the same path it was in World War II. In the Mexican War scenario the U.S. invades to oust a government whose policies have created a flow across the border at the level of tens of millions. Although Weinberger's main purpose is to make a case for improved theater and national ballistic missile defense capabilities, the book demonstrates that there are serious thinkers who look to the future and see major regional conflicts. Maneuver from the Sea, for all its strengths, does not adequately address the mine warfare issue.
How does Maritime Prepositioning
The confined waters of the Gulf neutralize the stand off distance allowed by an over the horizon capability. Based on the experience of the Gulf War, a forcible entry on the Iranian coast looks problematic. The idea of commercial shipping following an ARG through mines looks ludicrous.
The lack of an assembly at sea capability and the requirement to shore base logistics are not the main problems hindering the rapid build up of combat power ashore--mines are. Rather than replace the enhanced maritime prepositioning force, money would be better spent on behalf of the squadron at Diego Garcia by adding a floating dry-dock with a flotilla of minesweepers.
The enhanced maritime prepositioning force was crafted based on lessons from CENTCOM in the Gulf War and Somalia. Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010 does not achieve its frill potential in the constrained environment of the Gulf. An ideal force of this theater is an enhanced maritime prepositioning force with minesweepers in a floating dry-dock.
The War After Next: A New Superpower
The future for the American military is not contained in the Chairman's Joint Vision 2010. That military has already been conceptualized, its weapons purchased or under construction, and its doctrine established or evolving. Much of it already exists today. The real military of the future is the one which will come after this next one. This force will reflect profound changes in the international security environment and the nature of warfare. The United States, without a serious threat on the near horizon is in a position to contemplate these changes and explore alternative approaches to national security. A missed opportunity in this period of reprieve could be disastrous if this future force is built on the operational concepts and force structure of the 1980's.
These are the principal themes in Paul Bracken's article, "The Military After Next." American interests in 1997, prudent military leadership could not ignore its recurrence at some future time. If one was convinced that it was likely to follow "chaos in the littorals," then would Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010 still be the vehicle of choice?
If the superpower was a reborn Russian Empire with its eyes once again toward its lost satellites in Europe, then amphibious operations are of marginal importance as discussed previously. Even if the superpower were to be China, still claiming the bulk of the South China Sea, the power projection capability of MPF 2010 may not be the answer. Putting ground forces on the mainland would pit American weakness against Chinese strength. In the nightmare scenario postulated by the sinophobes, an invasion of Taiwan, the situation would have to deteriorate to the point where the island would have to be retaken by force in order for MPF 2010's assembly at sea and tactical offload capability to come into play.
CHAPTER SIX AN ALTERNATIVE FOR THE FUTURE
Joint Vision 2010 and Full Spectrum Trap
The chairman's Joint Vision 2010 focuses on "full spectrum dominance" as the key characteristic of the armed forces in the next century.
31 Additionally, he holds that "power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will remain the fundamental strategic concept for our future force." 32 In describing the future "agile organizations" that he wants the services to provide, he dictates that they "must become more responsive to contingencies with less 'startup' time between deployment and employment."
33
With the dual major regional conflict framework of the "Bottom Up Review" under scrutiny and without a defined threat on which to base strategy and force structure, the services have been left to base requirements on the more nebulous basis of capabilities. Each one claims, of course, the need to possess the capacity to deal with the full spectrum of threats right up to a peer or near peer competitor. While prudent measures should be taken to handle this possibility, it can become an artifice used to inflate requirements.
OMFTS asserts that its techniques "must be of use in a wide variety of situations, ranging from humanitarian relief to a high stakes struggle with a rising superpower." This clearly presupposes Marine forces trained in these techniques and equipped for warfare up to the top end of the conflict spectrum. Unless the use of the dramatic phrase, "high stakes struggle" is Finally, China would have to acquire a power projection navy equal to at least half the Soviet Navy in its heyday and the will to use it. Neither Joint Vision 2010 nor Operational Maneuver from the Sea make a convincing case for this contrived string of events. They only invoke the imprecise threat of a superpower on the horizon.
A Capability in Search of a Threat _____________________________________________________________________________
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